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Morality, Religion, and Public Bioethics:
Shifting the Paradigm for the Public Discussion
of Embryo Research and Human Cloning
BRIAN STILTNER

Public ethics bodies play a major role in the development of public policies that
govern scientific research and health care.' Their tasks include weighing the eth
ical ramifications of forms of research, educating the public about the research
and its likely benefits, and recommending directions for institutional practices
and legal policies. Much debate about public ethics bodies has concerned the
mode and level of their ethical reasoning. Should public ethics bodies develop
substantive moral arguments on issues that are subject to widely divergent moral
and religious interpretations, such as the status of the human embryo? To develop
such arguments would, of course, require ethics panels to consider the ethical
and philosophical arguments about the status of the embryo as well as arguments
about the dignity of the human person, the symbolic and social value of procre
ation, and so on. Is this something we should expect ethics panels to do?
The question can be fratned thus: Should public bioethics committees develop
substantial moral arguments or make only procedural arguments about the com
peting interests involved? Ethics bodies wrestling with these controversial ques
tions face a quandary: To what extent and in what way should they attend to the
pluralism of moral and religious views in society? If an ethics body is sensitive
to such views, even the most common ones expressed in the society, and seeks
to rely on them for insight, it will have a difficult time drawing these multiple
threads into a unified conclusion that can speak to all citizens. Yet if the ethics
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body limits its engagement with moral and religious views in the hopes of de
livering clear recommendations acceptable to a broad public, it runs the risk of
antagonizing various interest groups and perhaps a large segment of the public
who expect to see the report firmly grounded in moral or religious principles or
both.
To explore this question, this chapter considers how moral and religious ar
guments were employed in the reports of two bioethics committees: the 1994 re
port of the Human Embryo Research Panel (HERP) and the 1997 report on human
cloning of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC). Through a
reading of the ethical sections of the HERP report, 1 will explore the tensions be
tween the substantive and procedural modes of ethical argument. Although the
HERP commendably developed an ethical framework to guide its policy recom
mendations, its framework is pulled between the competing demands of the two
forms of argumentation. The panel hoped to avoid the policy-making stalemate
it thought would occur if it put forth a substantive argument concerning the moral
status of the human embryo. Its thought was that such an argument would then
be contested by citizens opposed to embryo research for substantive reasons, and
there would be no way to resolve these differences in a political forum. In my
view, not only does this strategy not work, but the report displays the panel’s
confusion about the kind of argument it was making. Indeed, the panel makes
substantive arguments about the embryo, but wants to keep these arguments im
mune from the contest of substantive debate.
After discussing the HERP report I will consider the NBAC’s exploration of
religious arguments about cloning. The commission exhibits far less skittishness
than the panel about engaging substantive arguments; indeed, it explores reli
gious traditions as sources of insight for the policy debate. Yet the same prob
lem is evident in the NBAC report: The commission does not make clear what
role these particular moral arguments should play in policy formation, nor does
it persuasively connect these arguments to its own recommendations, which take
a largely procedural tack. Both reports are hampered by an outlook that seeks to
constrain public bioethics either to procedural arguments alone or to a certain
kind of substantive argument that tries not to rely on any particular moral or re
ligious worldviews.
I will argue that it is misguided to drive a wedge between substantive and pro
cedural modes of argument, since they have a natural and necessary connection
to each other and tend to work best in conjunction. As an alternative to the two
committees’ approaches to public policy, I outline a different model—a common
good approach to policy formation in which procedural and substantive argument
each have a place. I suggest that public ethics bodies can use religious arguments
and perspectives as a legitimate resource for policy making in four ways: by re
flecting back the arguments and values that citizens use in making up their minds
on issues, by showing how religious considerations would support or undermine
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various policy options, by appreciating that religious groups play an important
political role both when they challenge a reigning social consensus and when
they support it, and by envisioning concrete roles for religious organizations in
the public debate.
In the common good model, particular religious and moral traditions are seen
as potential contributors to public debate instead of divisive voices to be excluded.
To develop such a model is by no means simple. In general, this model would
pluralize and broaden policy discussions extensively; it views bioethics commit
tees less as definitive decision-making bodies and more as the generators and
synthesizers of a wider public debate. This process of policy formation will be
slower and more chaotic than other options; yet in the long term it is likely to
be both more effective and^uore beneficial to the public good.

The double-bind of the Human Embryo Research Panel
The HERP was charged with sorting through the scientific, therapeutic, and eth
ical questions associated with federal funding of research in preimplantation
human embryos. Harold Varmus, the director of the National Institutes of Health
(NIH), asked the panel to assess the types of research that should and should not
be acceptable for federal funding and to propose any warranted guidelines for
research beyond those already in place.^ The HERP’s charge was thus fairly fo
cused both as to the scientific subject matter (research on the preimplantation
human embryo) and as to the scope of guidance sought (in what forms and under
what conditions such research could be funded).
The HERP report makes sure to note the limited scope of the charge; in par
ticular, research with in utero fetuses and fetal tissue transplantation were out
side the panel’s scope, for these matters are already forbidden federal funding.^
At the same time, “Panel members were given wide latitude in identifying the
specific issues and questions that needed attention and the approach they would
take in analyzing and addressing them.”'* Therefore, while commentators should
resist criticizing the HERP for not addressing issues outside its purview, they
may justifiably criticize or praise the ethical, political, and scientific framework
by which the panel analyzes the issues, for these were matters of the panel’s
choosing.
My interest here is with the ethical framework that underlies and justifies the
HERP’s recommendations and how that framework is thought to relate to the
broad range of moral views in the United States. The panel identifies three major
ethical considerations under which it finds certain forms of preimplantation em
bryo research acceptable.^ First, the prospect of significant scientific and thera
peutic benefits provides a strong reason to pursue and fund promising areas of
research. Second, the human embryo “warrants serious moral consideration as a
developing form of human life,” but, as its moral status is not on par with an in-
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fant or adult, this consideration should guide and limit emhryo research rather
than ban it altogether. Third, because embryo research will occur with or with
out federal funding, it is better that the government involve itself by providing
funding, to which it may then attach conditions and restrictions.
What are the theoretical justifications for these ethical considerations? The fun
damental goods the HERP seeks to promote are (7) human health, to be achieved
especially through the correction of diseases and the removal of impediments to
physiological functioning; and (2) personal autonomy, to be facilitated by en
suring informed consent in research, protecting patients from unwarranted health
risks, and promoting procreative liberty. Hence, we notice a primary stress on in
dividual rights and well being. These goals are advanced in a public policy frame
work that is largely consequentialist: It involves weighing benefits against risks
and then determining the policy that will produce the best overall balance of re
sults. The framework is not thoroughly consequentialist, for sharp boundaries are
set by individual rights (the rights of bodily safety and procreative liberty are
strong in this framework), while softer limits are set by public sensitivities over
such matters as the moral status of fetuses, the nature of families, and the in
tegrity of procreation. Communal needs have only a weak role in this framework;
they appear most notably through the concern for public sensitivities. The pub
lic’s health stands in the background of the whole analysis, for the advances made
through research can potentially benefit any member of society. Yet all of these
claims about communal goods are weakly defended, if at all. No attention is given
to such issues as the just distribution of health care resources, what the nation’s
research priorities should be, how embryo research might improve the health and
well-being of children and families as a whole (rather than as individuals), and
how the public can become further involved in these deliberations.^
Having examined the general ethical framework of the HERP report, let us
look at how it handles particular moral viewpoints. Several important ethical is
sues are implicated in such research, including the protection of human subjects,
the right of reproductive liberty and its scope, the aspirations and well-being of
infertile couples, the needs of persons with genetic illnesses, justice in the dis
tribution of medical resources, and many others. Yet by far the most sensitive and
contentious issue the HERP had to face was the moral status of the human em
bryo. The American public exhibits a wide range of ethical opinion on this issue.
In light of the strong feelings and organized political support for the pro-life
cause, the panel had good reason to fear that its recommendations would be drawn
into the political fray over abortion. The panelists tried to avoid this result by the
way they went about their task. They maintained a narrow focus on the preim
plantation embryo, deferring to existing protocols and laws regarding the post
implantation embryo. Also, they invited and listened to pro-life representatives
in their public hearings, perhaps to convey their appreciation that there are strong
pro-life concerns about this research.
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As can be expected, the panel’s desire to sidestep the abortion issue influences
its ethical argument. Let us briefly look at the HERP’s identification of a prin
ciple of moral concern for the human embryo that is worthy of increasing respect
over the course of its development. The panel finds problematic many substan
tive determinations of the embryo’s status, namely, those that determine moral
personhood according to a single criterion. Single criterion approaches propose
one characteristic or power of a human being, possession of which is sufficient
for moral personhood and moral protectability.^ The panel gives the most atten
tion to the criterion of possessing a unique diploid genotype, which a human em
bryo has once fertilization is complete; this view is more popularly expressed as
the conviction that personhood begins at conception. Many other qualities can
serve as a single criterion, such as the presence of brain activity, the ability to
feel pain, or the possession of well-developed cognitive abilities. The panel briefly
describes the conceptual problems that each of these proposed criteria face if es
tablished as the sole sufficient criterion for moral personhood.
The panel prefers a second broad approach to establishing moral personhood,
a pluralistic one. This approach “emphasizes a variety of distinct, intersecting,
and mutually supporting considerations. According to this view, the commence
ment of protectability is not an all-or-nothing matter but results from a being’s
increasing possession of qualities that make respecting it (and hence limiting oth
ers’ liberty in relation to it) more compelling.’’^ The HERP uses this framework
to affirm all of the previously mentioned qualities and others, too, as relevant to
appraising the increasing moral status of the fetus over the course of its devel
opment. Moral respect begins minimally with fertilization and increases gradu
ally “until, at some point, full and equal protectability is required.’’ The HERP
does not say where that final point is, because it does not need to: For its pur
poses, the preimplantation embryo clearly does not meet enough criteria to war
rant protection against research. Nonetheless, the panel feels that for public pol
icy purposes, some clear line is needed as a time limit after which preimplantation
embryo research may not continue. The panel established the time of the ap
pearance of the primitive streak at 14 days as that limit. This characteristic is not
a firm marker of moral personhood, but it does mark a new developmental stage,
after which neural material (a physical condition for sentience) begins to develop.
Based on this ethical factor and other considerations, the HERP settled on the 14
day time limit “as a compromise among competing viewpoints.’’^
Now compare these reflections on the embryo’s status with the HERP’s stated
desire to remain neutral with respect to various views about that status:
Americans hold widely different views on the question of the moral value of prenatal life
at its various stages. These views are often based on deeply held religious and ethical be
liefs. It is not the role of those who help form public policy to decide which of these views
is correct. Instead, public policy represents an effort to arrive at a reasonable accommo
dation of diverse interests. To the extent possible, it takes into account the diverse moral
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sensibilities that exist in the community. Even constitutional reasoning acknowledges the
importance of diverse but deeply held views. Public policy employs reasoning that is un
derstandable in terms that are independent of a particular religious, theological, or philo
sophical perspective, and it requires a weighing of arguments in the light of the best avail
able information and scientific knowledge.

According to this paragraph, the panel wishes to establish bioethical policy
with an appreciation of moral diversity, but on the basis of publicly accessible
reasons. Is this statement of principle compatible with the argument for moral
respect? Can the panel assurne a stance of respect for the embryo while remain
ing neutral about its moral status?
We must first note that the paragraph above is not an aberration. Both in the
cover letter to the final report and in its Executive Summary, the HERP claims
that it was not called on to adjudicate among competing understandings of the
embryo’s status and that it did not try to do so.*' The panel is at pains to make
this claim for neutrality. Yet it is undeniable that the HERP’s recommendations
are guided in large part by its ethical analysis, an analysis that includes an ex
amination and interpretation of competing views of the embryo’s status. The
panel’s ethical judgment, in essence, is that the preimplantation embryo deserves
some respect, for it has the potential to acquire the characteristics that will even
tually grant it moral personhood; yet it is impossible to specify how much re
spect, except to say that it is more than no respect at all and something less than
the full moral respect due to a (bom) person. Beyond this general determination,
the HERP believes that it has no special knowledge or authority such that it could
ask all Americans to accept its view of the matter. So, indeed, the HERP is not
refusing to take a stand on the moral status of prenatal life; it is not neutral about
this matter.
This reading fits with the panel’s actual ethical analysis, for the panel makes
philosophical arguments about why the single criterion view is inadequate, why
the embryo is certainly not a person just after fertilization, and why the appear
ance of the primitive streak marks a time of increased value of embryonic life.
Then what are we to make of the panel’s statement, “it is not the role of those
who help form public policy to decide which of these views is correct,” and its
other claims to neutrality? To alleviate the inconsistency, the HERP would have
to modify one of its two trains of argument. Either it is making a philosophically
grounded, ethical argument about the status of the embryo, judging as it does
that some moral arguments are better than others; or it is only engaged in the
task of balancing competing interests fairly, having no need to develop an argu
ment that the embryo deserves a measure of moral respect.
Part of the inconsistency can be attributed, no doubt, to the fact that the report
was developed by a committee of persons with different expertise and ideas—a
common enough occurrence and one on which we need not dwell. Yet I also
sense a fundamental lack of clarity on the part of the panel about the very na-
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ture of the argument it wants to make. What we find in the report is a mixture
of substantive and procedural argument. By “argument” I mean a mode of rea
soning that articulates and justifies an opinion on a moral issue and a related
mode of discourse that explains such reasoning to others so as to demonstrate
that the opinion is justified and could command the others’ assent. Let me ex
plain how such arguments operate.
A substantive argument reasons about values and principles and then applies
them to the issue at hand, seeking a substantial resolution of the ethical matter.
Substantive arguments may work from any number of particular religious and
philosophical traditions. For instance, substantive responses to the question of
embryo research could be developed from Roman Catholic natural law theory
and Catholic teaching regarding the protection of unborn life, from Jewish teach
ings on medicine and the status of the fetus, from a Biblically based Christian
perspective, and from any other religious perspective. Likewise, substantive an
swers could be derived from the frameworks of liberalism, communitarianism,
libertarianism, Marxism, feminism, and many other philosophical schools and
traditions. What makes any given approach substantive is the conceptual frame
work from which it is advanced: if that framework involves comprehensive ac
counts of human beings and what is of value to them, including nonpolitical
goods and values, then that framework is substantive.
An alternative is to eschew the moral questions that are essentially based on
particular worldviews and to take a procedural approach to the policy questions.
A procedural mode of argument weighs the expected benefits and potential harms
for all parties involved and tries to come up with a solution that is just. A strong
form of procedural argument holds that questions of justice (how to maximize
benefits to the public while being fair to all affected parties) and questions of
procedure (whether the decision-making process is democratic and fair) are the
only considerations for public ethics bodies.
Where does the HERP report fit? It is clear that the panel marshals ethical con
siderations in favor of its recommendation to fund some embryo research. Is the
form of its ethical argument substantive or procedural? R. Alta Charo, a panel
member who unsuccessfully argued in favor of its taking a procedural approach,
later termed the panel’s method “deductivism,” the process of reasoning from an
ethical theory—or, better, from philosophical principles that are not beholden to
any particular philosophical method—to specific applications. She finds this
method flawed:
The usual deductivism of public bioethics is doomed in the absence of an agreed method
ology for resolving conflicts among competing ethical theories. Indeed, the deductivist
form of public bioethics becomes most useless precisely when it is most needed, i.e., when
fundamental principles grounded in faith-based moral systems (e.g. the sacredness of
human life) conflict with appeals to empiricism and consensus-based values.'^
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In short, the panel makes an ethical argument that it hopes will not mire it in ad
judicating among diverse ethical values—a project Charo thinks is sure to fail.
Charo proposes an alternative method that seeks a purely procedural approach.
In what she calls a “political ethics analysis,” a public ethics body such as the
panel should deem the question of the fetus’s status irresolvable in a pluralistic
public forum. Rather, it should weigh the interests of “already born members of
the population” and ask “whether ethical principles of justice require that one or
another of their interests be given preference.”'^ A political ethics analysis con
siders the harms and benefits that are likely to attend different policy options.
The weighing will consider medical benefits and harms as well as the emotional
and political ramifications on all interested parties. For instance, a committee
should be concerned with the pain that will be felt both by infertile couples if
fertility research is stymied and by pro-life-oriented citizens if embryo research
is approved. In such an analysis, the particular moral viewpoints do matter—not
to establish a substantive position (the status of the fetus), but because they af
fect the interests of those who hold them.
The balancing should also consider to what extent the interested parties have
access to the means to fight for their viewpoint in the public forum. Political
ethics is concerned with the vitality of the political process and fairness to all in
terested parties; hence, Charo maintains that this approach would give greater
deference to the views of those who lack the political strength to defend their in
terests. In this way, political ethics is quite unlike political pragmatism.'"* With
Charo’s argument in mind, one can easily see her influence in those passages of
the HERP report that abjure taking any stand on the moral status of the embryo.
Because the panel did not embrace fully the political ethics approach, however,
it exacerbated the sense of indetermination between the two approaches.
Some commentators, while agreeing with Charo that the HERP tried to make
a substantive argument and did not succeed, render very different advice to the
panel. George Annas, Arthur Caplan, and Sherman Elias believe that the HERP
got caught between its need to address the status of the embryo and its desire to
avoid becoming a judge of substantive moral viewpoints. In their view, the way
out of the bind would have been for the panel to offer a fully developed, sub
stantive moral argument. They write:
The reason the panel’s recommendations have been more or less ignored has little to do
with its generally reasonable conclusions. Rather, in our view, it is because the panel did
not make a persuasive moral case for the conclusions. Unless a strong moral framework
is presented that recognizes and addresses the concern of those troubled by the use of
human embryos for research, such research is unlikely to gain the political acceptance
needed for it to receive federal funding.'^

For these authors, the panel persuasively made the basic claim that the em
bryo does not have rights at the moment of conception or during its early de-
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velopment. Yet they take issue with the HERP’s use of the pluralistic approach,
for they find that the panel did not give sufficient argument to make this frame
work convincing:
[T]hat framework requires a detailed analysis that explains why the particular properties
cited confer moral worth, or to what degree each property cited is necessary and suffi
cient. Without such an underlying rationale, the framework looks like an attempt to ra
tionalize a desired conclusion—namely, that some research on embryos ought to be
permitted—rather than to derive a conclusion from an ethical analysis.
. . . Without knowing why certain properties count, we cannot draw clear boundaries
between acceptable and unacceptable types of research. From a pluralistic perspective, we
cannot tell whether it is right to prohibit research after the primitive streak appears at 14
days’ development. Why should research on older embryos not be allowed, if it would
benefit other embryos, fetuses, children, or adults?'®

Annas, Caplan, and Elias put forth this argument precisely because they want
to see valuable research in this area go forward: They believe that the political
terrain of abortion is so sensitive that an argument for embryo research has to be
carefully disentangled from the abortion debate. That cannot happen unless a
“strong” and “persuasive” moral argument is made; moreover, this argument
should be one that takes account of citizens’ moral qualms and convictions.
Until it is demonstrated that embryos are owed moral consideration, concern about the
ethics of research on embryos can be dismissed as “nothing more than fights over sym
bols.” However, such curt dismissals completely fail to respond to the deep moral reser
vations about such research held by many Americans, including the President. By adopt
ing a bald political compromise on a moral issue, the panel guaranteed that its report
would have no effect.'^

At the end of this quotation, Annas, Caplan, and Elias cite the article in which
R. Alta Charo advances her criticism of the HERP report, although it is not clear
to what extent they are affirming Charo’s analysis. Certainly Charo would not
agree that the panel should have made a fuller substantive case for the embryo’s
status; on this matter she advocates an approach closer to political compromise.
Except for their suggestions that the panel needed to display greater sensitivity
to those citizens who are troubled by embryo experimentation, these two inter
pretations of the HERP report stand opposed. Listening to such criticisms, the
panelists might well feel, as the old saw puts it, that they were damned if they
did and damned if they didn’t. Charo criticizes the panel for trying to make a
substantive moral argument at all', Annas, Caplan, and Elias fault it for not mak
ing enough of a substantive argument; and various politicians, interest groups,
and citizens complain that it made the wrong substantive argument. Clearly, the
HERP was subject to many expectations and could not have hoped to please
everyone, yet the double-bind I have identified—that the HERP wanted to es
chew substantive argument but ultimately could not—was of its own making. So
what could the panel have done differently?
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I suggest that we do not have to choose between the substantive and proce
dural approaches. Indeed, I doubt that we can. For procedural arguments about
justice necessarily depend on a deeper level of substantive reasoning about the
persons and the community involved. Debates about justice may focus on fair
ness, but they are never simply about fairness. We cannot truly know what it
means to be just unless we have some idea about who counts as a member of the
community that is trying to set up fair procedures and unless we have some vi
sion of why it matters to be just in the first place. To have some idea about these
matters, one has to reason within a substantive ethical framework, or at least be
prepared to appeal to one. Certainly not every discussion and debate about jus
tice in our society has to delve into these fundamental questions, but we ought
to be aware that procedural arguments ride on the shoulders, as it were, of sub
stantive arguments and agreements.
In arguing about justice and public policies with our fellow citizens, we will
often find it unnecessary to appeal to our substantive frameworks. Yet it happens
that impasses are reached when all sides know that the source of disagreement
lies at the substantive level. At these times, the debate is not advanced by the
parties continuing to push their claims about procedural rights. 1 agree with Annas,
Caplan, and Elias that what is needed at these times is not less substantive ar
gument, but more. In the third section, 1 will develop an approach to public pol
icy that brings together the two approaches in a coherent and mutually strength
ening fashion. Before proceeding to that, 1 will explore in the next section how
the NBAC intimates a more promising approach in its report on human cloning
by exploring, in much greater depth than does the HERP, substantive ethical and
religious perspectives on the technology in question.

The more promising approach of the
National Bioethics Advisory Commission
The NBAC’s work was similar in many ways to that of the HERP.'* Both pan
els held a series of public meetings during which they discussed the general ap
proach they would take to the issue, heard from members of the public and var
ious experts to inform their deliberations, and, through a process of delegated
writing, group editing, and voting, produced reports of approximately 100 pages.
Similarly to the HERP, the NBAC tried to focus its questions and method of pro
ceeding so that the issue could be effectively addressed. The NBAC chose to
focus on the specific question of the propriety of cloning a human being through
somatic cell nuclear transfer with the goal of creating a child. Like the HERP,
its report contained chapters surveying the scientific, ethical, and policy issues.
There are instructive differences between the two bodies as well. Unlike the
HERP, the NBAC also devoted a chapter to religious perspectives on the issue.
The NBAC tended to survey a wider variety of pro and con perspectives on the
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use of cloning and did not push to come to a definitive resolution of most of the
major questions. In large part because the issue of cloning was so new (or at least
seemed to be), the NBAC did not feel able or required to make strong policy rec
ommendations. In a way, the commissioners were trying to say: Both the public
and experts have not had enough time to think the issue through; therefore, to
speak of a public consensus on most of these matters would be premature. At the
same time, however, they recognized an operative public consensus on a few fun
damental issues: (7) The issue is new and needs to be discussed and investigated
further and (2) our lack of knowledge about the safety of cloning indicates that
the technology should not be used to create human embryos, especially with the
aim of bringing them to term.
In this section, I will argue two points: that the NBAC’s engagement with sub
stantive moral frameworks, particularly religious frameworks, makes a fresh and
useful contribution to the public debate about cloning, but that the NBAC puts
itself in a bind similar to the HERP’s by failing to provide a thorough rationale
for its ethical recommendations. I will develop these claims by exploring the
NBAC’s treatment of religious arguments about cloning.
A distinctive feature of the NBAC report, in contrast to reports by the HERP
and other public ethics bodies, is that the commissioners devote a chapter to re
ligious perspectives. This chapter, the third in the report and roughly as long as
the chapter on ethical considerations that follows it, surveys cautionary and af
firmative arguments about human cloning in Western religious traditions.
Christianity (both Catholic and Protestant), Judaism, and Islam are the focus of
attention, although the commission also looked at Eastern religious views dur
ing its research. The NBAC opens this discussion by noting three reasons for in
vestigating religious views at all.*® First, it is important to look at religious views
because these inform many citizens’ opinions, and they can be a source of en
richment in the broad public debate. Second, the commission wanted to see if
religious reasons overlap with secular reasons and might thereby contribute to a
rough social consensus on certain matters. Third, the NBAC realizes that the
strength of religious views in opposition to a policy may make that policy un
enforceable; hence, there is a practical need for policy makers to know which
policies citizens are willing and unwilling to support, and why.
The report goes on to explore at some length broad theological themes in
Western religions, such as human beings as creatures of God, responsible do
minion over creation, human dignity, and the meaning of procreation. The report
presents the range of interpretations given to these themes and applies them to
cloning. A complex picture develops. On the one hand, several fundamental be
liefs in Judaism^hristianity, and Islam caution against cloning and condemn a
variety of motives that would lead to its use. On the other hand, some interpre
tations within all three religions suggest the possible propriety of the technology
for certain reasons and within certain limits. The NBAC summarizes the positive
and negative assessments?A
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Specifically with regard to cloning humans to create children, some religious thinkers be
lieve that this technology could have some legitimate uses and thus could be justified
under some circumstances if perfected; however, they may argue for regulation because
of the danger of abuses or even for a ban, perhaps temporary, in light of concerns about
safety. Other religious thinkers deny that this technology has any legitimate uses, con
tending that it always violates fundamental moral norms, such as human dignity. Such
thinkers often argue for a legislative ban on all cloning of humans to create children.
Finally, religious communities and thinkers draw on ancient and diverse traditions of moral
reflection to address the cloning of humans, a subject they have debated off and on over
the last thirty years. For some, fundamental religious beliefs and norms provide a clear
negative answer: It is now and will continue to be wrong to clone a human. Others, how
ever, hold that more reflection is needed, given new scientific and technological develop
ments, to determine exactly how to interpret and evaluate the prospect of human cloning
in light of fundamental religious convictions and norms.

The NBAC does not try to show whether some religious arguments are better
than others, saying that such assessment would be beyond its competency and
purview, but tries rather to understand better (and to help Americans understand
better) the diversity of religious views. The commission comes to the conclusion
that “the wide variety of religious traditions and beliefs epitomizes the pluralism
of American culture. Moreover, religious perspectives on cloning humans differ
in fundamental premises, modes of reasoning, and conclusions. As a result, there
is no single ‘religious’ view on cloning humans, any more than for most moral
issues in biomedicine.”^'
It is certainly true that there is no single religious view on cloning humans,
only various religious views. The NBAC suggests that its proper role is to sur
vey these views, but not to employ them substantially in its own evaluation. The
reason, apparently (for the NBAC never says as much), is that such use would
put the commission into the difficult and controversial position of judging which
religious interpretations of human cloning are best. How can it do that in light
of the wide diversity of views within American society and within religious tra
ditions themselves? How can it do that and still respect the right of citizens to
hold any religious or irreligious views they wish?
My first approach to this question is to note that the investigation of religious
arguments plays a more significant role in the commission’s analysis than it ad
mits or perhaps even realizes. Consider its five key recommendations, which are
presented in the Executive Summary of the report. The religious views surveyed,
especially on the matter of human dignity,^^ certainly contribute to the consen
sus on caution and the mandate to ensure the safety of children and all human
subjects before any research may proceed (recommendation I). The temporary
ban on funding recommended by the NBAC (recommendations I and II) fits with
religious calls for banning or significant restriction on the use of cloning.^^ Most
religious views are supportive of genetic research for the purposes of therapy and
basic scientific knowledge,^'* so these views would likely support the narrow
purview of such a ban (recommendation III). The NBAC explicitly cites the plu-
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ralism of religious and ethical views in its call for a national dialogue (recom
mendation IV). It is not clear from the chapter on religion whether participation
in public dialogue is important to religious groups themselves, yet we may sur
mise that being able to participate in the public debate matters to those religious
groups, scholars, and citizens who make public statements on issues. Finally, the
need for more public education about cloning (recommendation V) is mentioned
as an activity that religious thinkers support.
The way the NBAC employs religious perspectives corresponds to the ratio
nales for investigating them in the first place. For one thing, religious views can
and do enrich the ethical and political discussions about cloning. Religions such
as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam bring long-standing theological and legal tra
ditions to bear on biomedical problems. Religious views can supply important
overarching visions to the debate; Some generic ones that emerge in the three re
ligions are the sanctity of human life, the value of nature, human responsibility
to care for nature, and warnings against human hubris and shortsightedness. To
be sure, these visions are not definitive foundations on which to draw up scien
tific policy, and policy makers must be careful in how they rely on religious ar
guments in their decisions. Yet these visions can be very valuable just because
they present an alternative way of looking at things: They may press into the de
bate a consideration of values—such as the well-being of vulnerable persons or
the quality of society’s common good—that have not been given their due in the
discussion up to now.
Religious views can also be valuable in their contribution to a broader public
consensus, which is the NBAC’s second rationale for exploring religion. Here we
see that the religious traditions studied, whether they find human cloning unac
ceptable or potentially acceptable, all raise a basic concern about the safety of
human subjects. The NBAC found that this was an ethical consideration that es
tablishes common ground between religious and secular perspectives, as well as
between multiple religious perspectives themselves.
The NBAC’s third rationale for listening to religious views was that policy
makers might better understand the political feasibility of proposed policies. The
public dismay that would be caused by government support for a technology such
as human cloning is a “social cost” that must be placed in the cost/benefit equa
tion considered by policy makers. The connection to religion is that religious
communities might be the locus of strong opposition to particular biomedical
policies, as some have proved to be in the past. With this angle in mind, the
NBAC concludes that the tenor of religious opinion in the United States moves
against human cloning, although this opposition is not monolithic. As far as re
ception by religious groups is concerned, the NBAC’s recommendation for a tem
porary ban with a sunset provision could be seen as trying to satisfy both clus
ters of religious opinion—those against and those cautiously for cloning.
The benefits of attending to religion are encompassed, the NBAC believes, in
these three rationales. Are these benefits enough, however, to justify the risk and
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difficulties that the use of religious arguments entails? The risks I have in mind
are those well-worn claims about the problems of achieving consensus in a plu
ralist society. The fear is that religion is too personal and involves too many nonrational elements to serve as a factor in public deliberation. To avoid the com
plications and passions that might be aroused by religious rhetoric, many would
say that we are best served by keeping public bioethics firmly on publicly ac
cessible, and thus secular, grounds.
We have evidence of this attitude in the HERP report. The NBAC’s reluctance
to draw explicit connections between its detailed, informative survey of religious
views and its recommendations to the President may indicate a similar worry
about employing substantive arguments in the public forum, especially arguments
that originate in religious frameworks. Yet, of course, religion is not and need
not be anathema in politics broadly conceived, in the “public square,” if it plays
an appropriate role. I think some benefits both procedural and substantive can be
seen by the NBAC’s attention to religion, although the commission itself only
acknowledges the former. The primary procedural benefit is that citizens who
rely on religious belief and principles in forming their political and moral opin
ions will see that there are ways they can connect their reasoning and ideas to
the public debate engendered by the report. There is a pragmatic side to this:
Religious citizens might feel that their concerns were “heard,” were taken at least
more seriously than they normally are by public ethics bodies considering sen
sitive matters. Such reception would be particularly important in mollifying re
ligious opponents of abortion, although I would not say that this should be the
reason for attending to religious views.
Going further, we could argue that including religious voices is a boon to
democratic deliberation: It models how religious arguments can be thoughtfully
and thoroughly explored. Appreciative understanding of another’s opinion is req
uisite for a genuine dialogue to occur. Such understanding has proved hard to at
tain in the sensitive areas in which religion and politics have mixed in recent
years. The NBAC report shows its readers that it is possible to talk about reli
gion as part of policy-oriented debates and to do so civilly.
Claiming these procedural benefits is not controversial, but identifying sub
stantive benefits might be. To claim that there is a substantive benefit entails, at
the least, that including religious perspectives improves the quality of argument
in the report. A stronger claim is that religious opinions bring to the table some
ethical and political arguments and values that would not otherwise receive suf
ficient consideration. To many readers, it may sound far-fetched to make such
claims for the NBAC report. After all, how differently would the report read if
the chapter on religious perspectives was not there at all? I believe the answer is
“not much differently.”
The NBAC would not have offered substantially different arguments and rec
ommendations had it not considered religious views as thoroughly as it did. This
is not to say that the consideration of religious views had no impact on its de-
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liberations, but to suggest that the consideration of religion confirmed rather than
significantly challenged the commission’s ethical and policy analyses. Some sub
stantive moral values encountered in the religious chapter, especially human dig
nity, seem to have shaped the commission’s recommendations for caution and a
temporary ban by confirming and supporting an analysis it made on secular
grounds. This confirmation is not unimportant, yet the NBAC is so restrained in
employing its investigation of religion that the chapter’s impact on the report is
negligible. The NBAC barely begins to draw on the rich insights that could be
derived from a theological concept of human dignity in distinction to a philo
sophical concept. The NBAC lays out the religious perspectives in the manner
of “on the one hand ... on the other hand,’’ making hardly any attempt to show
how citizens might actually work with these diverse religious opinions and think
their way through them. The chapters on ethics and public policy lay out simi
lar sets of pro and con arguments, but in these instances the NBAC uses the dif
ferences to present some of its own considered interpretations and conclusions.
Thus, the report is unbalanced. Religious perspectives are given a central place,
but their implications are not worked out in any detail. Courtney Campbell,
who prepared for the NBAC a commissioned paper on religious views of
cloning, holds up a similar criticism of the commission’s attention to religion:
“My own sense,” Campbell writes, “is that, in the NBAC hearings, the contribu
tions of religious perspectives were deemed politically important and ethically
insignificant.”^®
The NBAC began to demonstrate a constructive way of involving religion in
public policy discussions. Its report goes a few steps down a more promising
path, but does not carry its use of religious perspectives to an effective conclu
sion. What I am asking of public ethics bodies—and it is a tall order, I admit—
is that they be open to discussing religious perspectives on the issues at hand and
strive to make religious insights operative throughout their analyses and recom
mendations. How they can do so within the domain of a pluralist, democratic
polity will be the focus of my final section, in which I will sketch a common
good model for forming public policy. Continuing to focus on the areas of em
bryo research and human cloning, I will say more about the use by public ethics
bodies of procedural and substantive moral arguments and of religious discourse
as a form of substantive argument. What follows might be taken as general sug
gestions for how to develop the work started in the NBAC report.

A common good approach to policy formation
Recall that my purpose has been to find the best model of public discourse, one
that befits a democratic, pluralist culture and can help the discussants move closer
to the political common good in ways appropriate to the topic they are debating

SHIFTING THE PARADIGM FOR PUBLIC DISCUSSION

193

and deciding. The common good means a beneficial way of life for a society and
its members; more specifically, it refers to the social conditions that improve cit
izens’ well-being and help them live together peaceably. I am convinced that the
common good remains a viable goal for a liberal democracy and an accurate way
to describe what any instance of politics should ultimately be about.
Fundamentally, citizens of a political society seek to have a good life together.
When we specify that the society is a liberal society, we are saying that certain
limitations have been placed on the public’s pursuit of the common good out of
respect for the goods of personal autonomy and the diversity of human thought.
When we specify that the society is democratic, we mean that there are certain
political structures and methods through which the common good should be pur
sued. Both of these qualifications can be incorporated into the classical theory
of the common good to keep it relevant and workable in modem societies.
Understandably, the fact that citizens in a liberal democracy hold a variety of
religious and moral viewpoints presents a challenge to identifying and pursuing
a common good, at least in the substantive sense that the common good picks
out shared ideals of the good human life, shared virtues and values. Charo is re
sponding to this challenge when she proposes that public bioethics should focus
on procedures that will achieve fair, just, and democratic decisions. I think she
has one piece of the solution. Fair procedures and the resulting decisions are cer
tainly part of society’s commonweal, although in this case they are the proce
dural elements of the common good. Some would propose that the common good
for a pluralist, democratic society is to be understood only as a procedural com
mon good. As I have suggested in discussing both the HERP and the NBAC re
ports, I do not believe we have to choose between procedural and substantive
discussions of policy issues or, by extension, between a procedural and a sub
stantive common good. Rather, I hope to show that the two forms of argument
need to work together because of their intrinsic connections and, moreover, that
the right use of substantive argument can strengthen the practice of public
bioethics.
What needs to be acknowledged from the outset is that we cannot avoid sub
stantive argument in the political arena. The presumption that we can leads to
facile claims, as when Steed Willadsen, a cloning researcher who works at St.
Barnabas Hospital in East Orange, NJ, says, “The fact is that, in America, cloning
may be bad but telling people how they should reproduce is worse. . . . America
is not ruled by ethics. It is ruled by law.’’^* His claim is simply incoherent, for
an ethical framework undergirds our law, and implicit in our political policies are
ethical assumptions. If our society is to think through the cloning issue adequately,
we must engage the ethical foundations of our law, the ethical assumptions of
current policies regarding medicine and research, and the ethical implications of
any proposed policies. We should not rule out any views just because they may
be characterized as religious, ethical, or particular to the thinking and traditions
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of a particular subcommunity within society. The mistake is to think that there
is some purely neutral ground on which scientific policy can be created.
A related aspect of our political culture is that citizens do use substantive moral
and religious beliefs to come to their political decisions. Therefore, it is appro
priate for public ethics bodies to make correlations between the arguments they
employ and those that are represented in the society at large. I do not mean that
ethics bodies have to use only arguments that can be found in the wider culture
or that they have to fit their reasoning to someone else’s; I simply mean that they
will do the public a service by locating their arguments within the context of the
ethical, religious, and technical arguments that are commonly found in the pub
lic forum. The NBAC did something to this effect by surveying religious and eth
ical perspectives, but it should have taken the additional step of showing where
it found those perspectives compelling in its own reasoning. (This use of reli
gious perspectives goes beyond the position attributed to commissioner Thomas
Murray in a news story, that the NBAC’s task was not to decide the validity of
ethical arguments, but simply to reflect the public’s concerns in its report.^®) By
listening to diverse ethical arguments, giving them expression in their reports,
and engaging them as worthy of response, public ethics bodies might contribute
to a less antagonistic relationship between themselves and oppositional members
of the public. These actions might help some citizens and groups feel less alien
ated and show them that their participation is welcome. Here the procedural dy
namic comes into play: A fair, open, and just process requires giving ample room
to diverse and dissenting voices.
I hold as central to a common good approach the claim that substantive moral
and religious viewpoints can be used as a resource in public bioethics. This use
can be justified in several ways. First, we can identify the positive contributions
that religious citizens and groups do in fact play in public life. Second, we can
note that substantive viewpoints do not pose the same difficulties at every level
of politics: Judges and elected officials, acting in their official duties, need to ex
ercise care to base their decisions on reasons that citizens could find reasonable.
At lower levels of political authority, though, the room for multiple rationales
and discourses increases, opening the door for both citizens and politicians to
rely on religious beliefs and arguments in making their cases in the public square.
This reliance is legitimate within a liberal democracy.^® The third and most ro
bust argument for religion’s role in politics would involve drawing out the ethi
cal and religious aspects of American political culture and of liberal democracy
itself Such a discussion would, however, take us too far afield.
Central to an argument that seeks a principled role for religion in a liberal
democratic society is the one I have been making: Substantive and procedural
arguments have a necessary connection in that procedural arguments rely on a
more fundamental substrate of substantive arguments and agreements in a com
munity. Agreements—and even most disagreements—about justice depend on
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tacit and deep-seated cultural agreements on matters of the good such as duties,
values, and virtues. Michael Walzer illuminates this relationship when contrast
ing moral maximalism, the “thick” morality of groups, with moral minimalism,
the “thin” appeal to universal concepts such as justice, fairness, and truth telling.
Walzer writes: “It is popular these days to think of the minimum in procedural
terms—a thin morality of discourse that governs every particular creation of a
substantive and thick morality. . . . Minimal morality consists in the rules of en
gagement that bind all the speakers; maximalism is the never-finished outcome
of their arguments.”^*
This proposition is flawed, however, for two reasons. First, the procedural rules
that make the pursuit of the common good possible in a democracy are already
quite thick—they are not something timeless, given in our nature and shared by
all cultures, but they are actually “a way of life,” a product of our particular po
litical history.^^ Second, the proposition gets the order backwards: It suggests
that the procedures logically and chronologically precede the development of a
substantive morality, when in fact a society requires a substantive morality as the
context in which any rules of engagement can be developed. Walzer’s general
picture of how thick (substantive) and thin (procedural) moralities are related is
this: Cultures and their members at any given point find themselves in posses
sion of a substantive morality; from this thick morality they can distill out a thin
ner, procedural morality as circumstances require. Thin morality is needed for a
variety of reasons: Among other things, it facilitates conversation in pluralistic
and cross-cultural contexts. The point I take from Walzer’s argument is that pro
cedural morality is a tool we can use effectively in a democracy, but we deceive
ourselves if we think that it is all we have. We need to remind ourselves of the
richer moral traditions and commitments to which we have access. As Annette
Baier puts it, speaking of the component of thin morality known as rights: “Rights
are only the tip of the moral iceberg, supported by the responsibilities that we
cooperatively discharge and by the individual responsibilities that we recognize,
including responsibilities to cooperate, in order to maintain such common goods
as civilized speech and civilized ways of settling disputes. For it takes more than
rights to settle disputes about rights.”^^
If this picture of procedural morality riding on the shoulders of substantive
agreements is accurate, then policy making must pay more attention to citizens’
religious and moral beliefs and the ways these support or challenge a liberal so
ciety’s working consensus on a procedural morality. When debates about justice
and rights come to an impasse, the only way through may be to broaden the scope
of the public conversation rather than narrow it. In sum, public bioethics com
mittees should hold substantive and procedural arguments together by surveying
the many religious and ethical perspectives that inform public debate (as the
NBAC did), taking firm stands on the ethical arguments (as the HERP did), and
defending those positions in the court of competing arguments (which neither
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committee did in any depth). Since these committees speak for the public, they
should show significant engagement with the multiple perspectives found in the
society at large. Such use is procedurally fair when it is wide and representative;
it is substantive when those perspectives influence the deliberations and conclu
sions of the committee.
My final task is to explain in more detail the most controversial part of this
argument: a public ethics body’s use of religious perspectives and arguments to
shape its deliberations and conclusions. Certainly there are inappropriate ways
of doing this; let me identify four appropriate ways to use religious views. First,
these bodies should attend to the importance of religion in the deliberations of
citizens. That is, they should help the public and policy makers recognize that
religious traditions constitute a resource that informs ethical and political values
in our public culture while delivering complex and various verdicts on any given
issue. As we have seen, the NBAC does this more so than the HERR Second,
public ethics bodies should show clearly how the religious considerations they
survey work to support or undermine certain policy options. Again, the NBAC
lays these out better than the HERR, but the NBAC does not make these consid
erations operative in its recommendations. Third, public ethics bodies should dis
cuss religion with sensitivity to the ways that religious views might modify and
challenge a secular consensus rather than merely overlap with it. Neither com
mittee does this. Finally, public ethics bodies should envision a concrete role for
religious organizations in the public dialogue. The NBAC suggests such a con
nection, but goes no further than to say that a national dialogue should occur.
We have encountered the first two ways of using religious arguments earlier
in this chapter, but the third and fourth are new claims that require defense. I
think the commissioners’ intuitions are right that religion should be a part of the
national dialogue on cloning and that religious views can play a valuable role in
public bioethics. It is fair to surmise that the NBAC is wary of cashing out the
religious perspectives to any significant degree because of the risks of bringing
religion into political deliberation. Can religious views really have a place in the
discourse of governmental institutions? Well, of course; they do in the NBAC re
port itself. More to the point: Can religious arguments appropriately be used as
reasons for policy decisions? The four ways of employing religion I have just
described violate neither constitutional principles regarding the separation of
church and state nor the spirit of a liberal democratic society, properly under
stood.^"*
Note that these methods do not in fact seek to base a policy decision on reli
gious reasons; they do seek to introduce the religious arguments that citizens
themselves employ into the discussion and deliberation that lead to policy deci
sions. I hold, then, that there is a crucial difference between employing religious
arguments as resources in policy making and using them as the foundations for
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policy making. In using religious views as resources, public ethics bodies will
be looking for ways that religious traditions can contribute to a public consen
sus in conjunction with secular approaches. They will also be looking for ways
that religious traditions can enrich the ethical, scientific, and policy discussions.
The NBAC sought to do both,^^ although it was vague on what it found en
riching for its own analysis in those religious interpretations. The commission
ers might have made more explicit how some general trends in the religious tra
ditions studied cohere with and support the recommendations they make. They
might also have noted that the way they seek an overlapping consensus tends to
put secular considerations in the driver’s seat and that this approach has its lim
itations. Religiously motivated citizens have sometimes performed a valuable
public service by challenging the reigning public consensus rather than simply
supporting it to the extent that their views overlap with it.
One might respond that this request to make religious arguments operative is
asking too much of the NBAC or any other public ethics body because they have
a difficult enough time bringing together the diversity of ethical arguments into
a coherent policy recommendation. Yet, by the same token, the commission asked
a lot of the religious scholars who testified before it when it pressed them to
translate their arguments into publicly accessible terms.Courtney Campbell
writes that those who testified faced the “translation” problem that generally con
fronts religious scholars’ attempts to participate in a public policy forum. Their
dilemma is whether to remain distinctive to their traditions and risk irrelevance
or to attempt the translation and risk diluting the content of their tradition’s wis
dom. Campbell finds it unfortunate that the commissioners “continually invited
the religious thinkers to delineate the significance of their claims about cloning
for a public that did not necessarily share the belief system and narratives of a
given faith tradition,” because this invitation makes two mistakes—it presumes
that there is a “public” with a settled consensus on values, and it “imposes a
higher burden of relevance” on religious thinkers than on others.
The religious scholars appearing before the NBAC did as well as they could
to meet the challenge, but we should stop to consider what gets lost if everything
a religious leader or citizen says in the public square has to be translated. My
way of understanding the matter is as follows.Religious groups and citizens
contribute to society’s common good in several ways. One is by offering intel
lectual resources to public debates. In this role, religious thinkers will want to
make the most effort to translate, for they have to make their views at least in
telligible (not necessarily reasonable) if they hope to influence political deliber
ation. Even so, there may be reasons they cannot or do not want to translate:
Although a concept like human dignity conveys its meaning effectively in both
religious and secular contexts, the concepts of proper stewardship and humility
before the Creator will lose some of their meaning and power if translated to
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a nonreligious context. I would not want to see a religious speaker’s concep
tual vocabulary reduced by the need continuously to translate for the sake of
relevance.
Two other ways religious groups and citizens promote the common good are
by creating conditions for social harmony through service and by promoting
goods for persons and society that are neglected or marginalized in the political
status quo. This last contribution is an aspect of religion’s prophetic task. Here,
again, religious groups may find that it advances their mission when they trans
late their language into publicly accessible terms, but they may also find that
such translation attenuates the distinctive vision of the common good they want
to present. In their prophetic role this is especially true. At the same time, my
argument does not entail that prophetic discourse has only a critical and never
a constructive task. Indeed, a religious group’s efforts to foster public dialogue
and draw out common values in the culture may be a prophetic act. As Campbell
puts it:
Part of the prophetic task of the religious tradition is to enable the discovery of values that
seem shared across the pluralism of a society’s diverse moral traditions, and to participate
in the retrieval, selection, and interpretation of such values as a basis for moral discourse
among citizens. This was the force, I believe, of the recurrent religious appeal in the NBAC
hearings to the “common good” in considering the ethics of cloning. . . .

The implication for public ethics bodies is not that they should adopt the prophetic
discourse of one or more religions but that they should acknowledge that re
ligions contribute in more ways than by translating their ideas into secular
discourse.
Public ethics bodies might serve the common good most effectively by pro
moting national dialogue, their contributions to which can include initiating pub
lic dialogue, synthesizing and expressing an operative public consensus, trying
to create a public consensus, or feeding information and recommendations into
a political body. Often an ethics body may have or take on several of these tasks,
a situation that makes its job more complicated by giving rise to competing ex
pectations on the public’s part. Of course, it is much easier to synthesize a pub
lic consensus rather than to create one."^° One cannot expect the NBAC to have
done either in the 90 days allotted to it on an issue as new to the public as human
cloning; one can only expect the NBAC to have initiated the public conversation
that might lead toward eventual consensus.
To get to the point where a consensus could be synthesized, public ethics bod
ies should think about how a national dialogue can take place and how their own
work connects to it. It is regrettable that the NBAC did not have the time to say
more about how its vision of a national dialogue could proceed.'*' Clearly, this
is a place where religious traditions can and should come into play. The NBAC
made a significant contribution by inviting religious scholars to testify, commis-
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sioning background studies on religious perspectives, and including a substantial
chapter on religious views in its report. Like the NBAC, 1 affirm the valuable
role religious organizations can play in promoting public education and national
dialogue. As I have argued, at times their contribution will be to complement
a public consensus and motivate their adherents to support it; at other times
their contribution could be to challenge the current consensus or the reigning
ideologies.
Religious institutions are already involved in the process of civic education on
timely ethical issues; This occurs when ministers make applications to those is
sues from the pulpit; when the issues are discussed in adult religious education
classes, the popular religious press, and other forums; when church bodies pub
lish statements; and when para-church organizations mobilize their members to
raise public awareness or create social change. In the case of cloning, a number
of religious bodies issued public statements in the wake of the announcement
about the cloned sheep, and we may imagine that various types of discussion
have been occurring in churches around the nation.'*^ Thus far, para-church or
ganizations have not made human cloning a major focus of their efforts, except
that religious (and nonreligious) pro-life organizations have been tracking the
work of the NBAC and other government bodies."^^ Because the American pub
lic is just beginning to reflect seriously on cloning and related advances in biotech
nology, the greatest need for religious groups is to promote reflection and to ed
ucate their members and the public about the underlying moral values and choices.
Public ethics bodies should consider formally involving religious institutions
in the work of public education: Churches, seminaries, religious scholars, and
the religious media could be very effective collaborators in this project. Public
ethics bodies should call on churches as forums for educating citizens on scien
tific advancements and their ethical ramifications; they should think explicitly
about churches as one type of public forum whenever they develop materials that
get distributed to community organizations. Ethics bodies might work with reli
gious institutions to improve the “ethical literacy” of the public."^"* As for the spe
cific methods, a starting point could be for the President to ask the National
Institutes of Health to create an initiative that engages religious and other com
munity leaders in a collaborative effort at public conversation and public educa
tion on bioethical issues. President Clinton’s Initiative on Race might serve as a
model or a starting point for thinking about the benefits and drawbacks of a
bioethics initiative."^^
Finally, we should not overlook the fact that use of religious argument might
influence policy making in some constructive ways. The NBAC’s consideration
of religious views filtered into deliberations in the United States Congress, par
ticularly when Senator Bill Frist organized a hearing before the Committee on
Labor and Human Resources, Subcommittee on Public Health and Safety, enti
tled “Ethics and Theology: A Continuation of the National Discussion on Human
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Cloning.”'*® This is one example of how government bodies can employ religious
perspectives and arguments as resources in their deliberations. For all the rea
sons discussed in this chapter, it is appropriate that religious perspectives should
have a voice in the political forum as well as the broader public forum.
We cannot expect the process of a national dialogue to be easy. Before we get
to consensus, we have to expect confrontation, a confrontation fueled in part by
religious groups acting in their prophetic role. Given how often citizens with
strong religious convictions are dismissed as unreasonable and an obstacle to pol
icy making, I hope this chapter has succeeded in showing how religious groups
can play a constructive role in public policy. It would be misguided, however, to
look to religion only when it can play that supportive role; one of my arguments
has been that religious groups contribute to the common good even when they
call technological progress into question. Public ethics bodies will best contribute
to public education and genuine public deliberation if they do not try to keep the
controversial arguments to the side by appealing to procedural strictures.
The common good approach to public conversation that I have laid out pro
poses that substantive arguments, even religious ones, have an important role in
public conversation and political deliberation. This model has a better chance
than its procedural or deductivist competitors of meeting the challenges that
face public ethics bodies and the public as they try to weave a way toward
consensus.
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